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Utah Const. Art. VIII, § 3 1 
i i i 
Statement of Jurisdiction 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Const. Art. VIII, § 3 and Utah Code § 
78-2-2(2)0) (West 2002). 
Statement of Issues 
Whether formally serving an individual represented as authorized to accept 
service on behalf of the Davis County Clerk complies with the Governmental Immunity 
Act's notice of claim requirement? 
Standard of Review 
Under Wheeler v. McPherson, 2002 UT 16, ^ 19, 40 P.3d 632, this Court reviews a 
"district court's dismissal of a case based on governmental immunity [as] a determination 
of law that we afford no deference." 
Statutory Provisions 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (West 2003) Addendum A 
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2 (West 2003) Addendum B 
Statement of the Case 
Appellant Melody Little brought a claim against Davis County for injuries she 
sustained at the historic Davis County courthouse in August of 2001. Davis County, on 
April 4, 2002, filed a Motion for Summary Judgment arguing, inter alia, that Melody 
failed to deliver a notice of claim to the Davis County Clerk and thereby deprived the 
trial court of jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11, 13. (R. 30-32, Def. Mem. 
1 
Supp. S.J. at pp. 4-5)1. Appellant Melody Little responded that process server Ken 
Thomson formally served Pat Beckstead, a person held out as authorized to accept 
service on behalf of the Davis County Clerk, with a notice of claim naming Davis 
County. (R. 94-95, Pis. Mem. Opp. S.J. at p. 4-5). Davis County replied that (1) the 
notice was not 'directed' to the Davis County Clerk (R. 165, Def. Reply p. 2) and (2) did 
not state with sufficient specificity the damages claimed and therefor remained deficient 
under the statute. (Id.). 
On November 15, 2002, the Second District Court, Davis County, Judge Michael 
G. Allphin presiding, ruled that the notice of claim was "not directed to the Davis County 
Clerk" and "was also deficient when it did not clearly set forth the damages incurred by 
the claimant so far as they are known." (R. 309, Ruling On Defendants Motion to 
Dismiss at p. 4). Accordingly the court found the claims "barred for failure to comply 
with the notice requirements." (R. 310 and Id. at 5). 
Statement of Facts 
On August 14, 2000, Melody Little went to the historic Davis County Courthouse 
to obtain her food handler's permit. (R. 91, Pis. Mem. Opp. p. 1). While exiting the 
building, she tripped and fell over a raised portion of concrete, injuring her face and 
elbow. (R. 1, Complaint at 1). Melody and her attorney drafted a notice of claim which 
1
 Note: The District Court's pagination of the record appears to be somewhat 
disordered at the time of Appellant's initial brief. Accordingly, cites are also given to the actual 
page numbers of the cited pleading. 
2 
specified damages as: a broken left arm, damaged teeth, pain and suffering, medical 
expenses and physical therapy expenses. (R. 44, Def. Mem. S.J. Exh. 1 A). On October 
25, 2000, process server Ken Thomson attempted to deliver a Notice of Claim to the 
Davis County Clerk. (R. 94, 123, Pis. Mem. Opp. p. 3 para 5 and Exh. D). Mr. 
Thomson found the Clerk unavailable and, as is his usual practice, asked if anyone in the 
office was authorized to accept service on behalf of the Clerk. (Id.). An employee in the 
office, Pat Beckstead, was represented as available to accept service on behalf of the 
Davis County Clerk. (Id.) LaMarr Holt, a Davis County employee, knew Pat Beckstead 
to be an employee of Davis County working within the Davis County Clerk's office. (R. 
115, Pis. Mem. at Exh B, p 34). Pat Beckstead also served as the Davis County Clerk's 
Notary Public. (Record at Def Mem SJ Rawlings Affidavit). Mr. Thomson personally 
served the Notice of Claim on Pat Beckstead. (R. 125, Pis Mem Opp Exh D). Although 
Davis County Clerk Steve Rawlings claims the notice of claim was "never directed or 
delivered to me," two days after service the insurer for Davis County received and 
processed the notice of claim. (R. 44, Def. Mem. Supp. SJ. at Exh. 1A). 
Summary of the Argument 
Mr. Thomson's directing and delivering the notice of claim to the Davis County 
Clerk fulfilled all statutory requirements. No statutory language imposes the duty to 
name the county clerk. Construing the statute to require naming the county clerk not 
only lacks a basis in the statute's language, but imposes a technical requirement that 
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frustrates the waiver of governmental immunity and deprives legitimately injured parties 
of their right to compensation. Moreover, no specific dollar amount in damages need be 
stated in order to satisfy the notice of claim requirements. The statute simply requires 
recitation of damages "so far as they are known." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 l(3)(a)(iii) 
(West 2003). Ms. Little first filed a notice of claim just two months after the incident. 
While this afforded Davis County the immediate opportunity to remedy the condition, it 
foreclosed setting forth a definite amount in damages. Of course, "it is the duty of the 
court to look to substance rather than to technicality in order that plaintiff may have a fair 
adjudication of her claim." Spencer v. Salt Lake City, 17 Utah 2d 362, 364-65, 412 P.2d 
449, 450 (1966). Because no statutory language supports the technical requirements 
imposed by the trial court, the dismissal of Melody's claim should not be allowed to 
stand as precedent. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DIRECTING AND DELIVERING A NOTICE OF CLAIM TO THE 
DAVIS COUNTY CLERK'S OFFICE FULFILLS THE STATUTORY 
REQUIREMENTS. 
Directing and delivering a notice of claim to the Davis County Clerk satisfies 
statutory requirements. Under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 l(3)(b)(ii)(B) (West 2003) a 
notice of claim must be "directed and delivered to: the county clerk when the claim is 
against the county." Here, process server Ken Thomson attempted to formally serve a 
notice of claim on the Davis County Clerk, Steve Rawlings. Finding Mr. Rawlings 
4 
unavailable, Ken Thomson sought someone who could receive service on his behalf. Pat 
Beckstead was represented as authorized to accept service on behalf of the Davis County 
Clerk. Ken Thomson then directed and delivered the notice of claim to the Davis County 
Clerk through Pat Beckstead. 
Providing a notice of claim affords 'the responsible public authorities an 
opportunity to pursue a proper and timely investigation of the merits of a claim and to 
arrive at a timely settlement, if appropriate, thereby avoiding the expenditure of public 
revenue for costly and unnecessary litigation." Nunez v. Albo, 2002 UT App 247, *| 25, 
53 P.3d 2. Even though Davis County alleges the notice to be improperly 'directed and 
delivered,5 the notice nonetheless found its way to McLarens, an international loss 
adjuster located in Murray, two days after formal service. (R. at 44, Def. Mem. Supp. 
SJ. at Exh. 1 A). The reasonable inference to draw from the facts is that the proper 
authority, the Davis County Clerk, received the notice of claim and then forwarded it to 
the insurance adjusters for further handling. Davis County held the opportunity to 
conduct an investigation and avoid the expenditure of public revenue, but instead chose 
to construct a defense based on a hypertechnical construction of the statute purportedly 
requiring that the Davis County Clerk be named. 
However, courts should not expand sovereign immunity beyond the language of 
the statute. While criticizing the doctrine of sovereign immunity, Justice Wolfe long ago 
noted that while "the matter of lifting immunity is, perhaps, properly the matter of 
5 
legislation... it behooves the courts judicially not to extend the doctrine." Niblockv. Salt 
Lake City, 100 Utah 573, 111 P.2d 800, 805 (1941)(Wolfe, J. concurring). No question 
exists that Utah appellate courts require 'strict compliance' with the Governmental 
Immunity Act. However, nothing in the statutory language requires that the Davis 
County Clerk be named. The statute simply necessitates 'directing and delivering5 and 
nothing more. See, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 l(3)(b)(ii)(B) (West 2003). 
Construing the Act to require that a notice of claim name the entity to which it is 
directed and delivered not only lacks a basis in statutory language, but also violates the 
statutory directive to construe waivers of governmental immunity liberally. Statutes in 
derogation of the common law must be construed to effect their purpose, not thwart the 
end sought by the legislature. Statutes in derogation of the common law "are to be 
liberally construed with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to promote 
justice." Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2 (West 2003). Prior to passage of the Governmental 
Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 et seq., the government remained immune 
from suit for damages under the premise that the King can do no wrong. "It is generally 
recognized throughout this country and in England that in the absence of a statute a 
municipality is not liable for the negligent acts of its servants while they are engaged in 
performing a governmental function or duty." Niblock, 111 P.2d at 801. By passage of 
the Governmental Immunity Act, "consent to be sued is granted, and liability of the entity 
shall be determined as if the entity were a private person." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-
6 
4(l)(b) (West 2003). 
Ken Thomson directed the notice of claim to the Davis County Clerk, Steve 
Rawlings. Finding Mr. Rawlings unavailable, he delivered the notice to Pat Beckstead, a 
notary within the Davis County Clerk's office and a person represented as authorized to 
accept service. Because Ken Thomson directed the notice to the county clerk and 
delivered it to Pat Beckstead, the trial court erred when it concluded that the failure to 
name the Davis County Clerk equated a failure to properly direct the notice to the 
required authority. Such a reading lacks a basis in the statutory language and simply 
serves to expand sovereign immunity, directly frustrating the purpose of waving 
immunity so that those injured by government negligence may be compensated. 
Moreover, none of the authorities relied upon by either Davis County or the trial 
court impose a requirement that the Notice of Claim name the office to which it is 
directed and delivered. In Wheeler v. McPherson, the claimant made the mistake of 
directing and delivering notice of claim to the county commissioners. Wheeler v. 
McPherson, 2002 UT 16, ^ j 16, 40 P.3d 632. The statute requires directing and 
delivering the notice to the county clerk. Accordingly, the notice in Wheeler failed by 
virtue of being directed and delivered to the wrong authority, namely the county 
commission and not the county clerk. Similarly, in Greene v. Utah Transit Authority, 
2001 UT 109, 37 P.3d 1156, and, Brown v. Utah Transit Auth., 40 P.3d 638 (Utah 
2002), the claimant failed to deliver the notice to the UTA president or secretary of the 
7 
board. Rather, the claimants delivered notice to the claims department/adjustor. Finally, 
in Hall v. Utah State Dep't of Corrections, 2001 UT 34, \ 26, 24 P.3d 958, the claimant 
conceded failure to comply with the notice requirements when he did not deliver a notice 
in advance of filing suit. In each of these cases, the claimant wholly failed to direct or 
deliver a notice of claim to the appropriate office. Because Melody Little directed and 
delivered a claim, via formal service of process, the trial court erroneously dismissed the 
claim. 
II. DAVIS COUNTY FAILED TO PROPERLY RAISE THE QUESTION 
WHETHER NOTICE ADEQUATELY RECITED DAMAGES, MAKING 
DISMISSAL ON THAT BASIS INAPPROPRIATE. 
Davis County failed to raise the argument that damages need be 'definitively5 set 
forth in its initial Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment. Where the issue is 
not raised until the reply memorandum, appellate courts refuse to consider the matter on 
appeal. "We can summarily dispose of [the] argument regarding unconscionability and 
lack of consideration. This argument was not before the trial court until [the] Reply 
Memorandum in support of its motion to revise." U.P.C., Inc. v. R.O.A. General, Inc., 
990 P.2d 945, 953 (Utah Ct. App.1999). "Since defendant first raised the issue in his 
reply memorandum, it was not properly before the trial court and we will not consider it 
for the first time on appeal." State v. Phathammavong, 860 P.2d 1001, 1004 (Utah Ct. 
App.1993). Davis County did not raise an argument regarding sufficiency of the claim 
for damages. Accordingly, this issue cannot now be considered as grounds to sustain 
8 
dismissal. 
III. THE NOTICE OF CLAIM DAMAGES RECITATION.ALLOWED 
DAVIS COUNTY THE OPPORTUNITY TO INVESTIGATE AND 
SETTLE THE MATTER. 
Even if Davis County properly preserved its argument, the trial court nonetheless 
erred in dismissing Melody's claim for failure to state the damages incurred. Damages 
need only be sufficiently set forth so that a determination as to liability exposure can be 
made. The statute simply requires enumerating the damages "so far as they are known.5' 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1 l(3)(a)(iii) (West 2003). By rasing the damages issue for the 
first time in its reply brief, Davis County prevented Ms. Little from presenting evidence 
that her injuries had not yet fully resolved even as of the date the reply brief was filed. 
While Ms. Little continued treatment no definite amount could be stated for monetary 
damages. 
A notice of claim need only set forth "the essential facts as soon as reasonably 
possible after the injury so that it will have ample opportunity to make a proper 
investigation." Spencer v. Salt Lake City, 17 Utah 2d 362, 364, 412 P.2d 449, 450 
(1966). Davis County alleges that failure to note the amount of damages rendered her 
notice of claim deficient. (R. 165, Def. Reply Supp. S.J. p. 2). The trial court held that 
"Plaintiff made no definite statement as to damages, other than to state 'amounts to be 
proved at trial.'" (R. 309, Court Ruling p. 4). However, Melody's notice recited a 
broken arm, damaged teeth, pain and suffering, and physical therapy as damages 
9 
incurred. (R. 44, Def. Mem. Supp. S.J. at Exh. 1A). Similarly in Spencer, the claim 
generally stated the nature of the alleged defect and the injury. Id The court held that 
where the damages statement gives authorities opportunity to investigate "it is the duty of 
the court to look to substance rather than to technicality in order that plaintiff may have a 
fair adjudication of her claim." Id. 364-65. The injuries and damages in Melody's notice 
gave Davis County ample opportunity to make a proper investigation. Allowing 
dismissal for failure to state an amount in damages elevates nonessential technicalities 
over the right to seek redress for substantive harm. 
Moreover, Melody's notice cannot be compared to that in the case relied on by the 
trial court, Johnson v. City of Bountiful 996 F.Supp. 1100, 1103 (D. Utah 1998). In 
Johnson, the claimant's letter did not "state a claim or any intention to do so" and did not 
state "damages incurred or provide any other information about their extent or nature." 
Id. Further, Ms. Little continued to undergo treatment for some time after submission of 
the notice of claim and, in fact, her injuries had not folly resolved at the time defense 
counsel took her deposition in March 2002.2 Not only does the purported requirement to 
set forth an 'amount' for damages find no basis in the statute, it would impose an 
insurmountable barrier for claimants whose injuries resolved at some point after the 
statute of limitations ran on filing a notice of claim. Because Ms. Little's claim set forth 
2
 According to Melody's deposition, taken on March 28, 2002, she was still 
undergoing treatment for her broken elbow and the doctors had not yet decided what to do. (See, 
Deposition Excerpt of Melody Little, attached as Addendum "D"). 
10 
the damages sufficiently to give Davis County an opportunity to investigate, the trial 
court erred in finding the notice of claim deficient. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in finding the failure to name Davis County Clerk fatal to 
Melody's notice of claim. There cannot be a more concrete showing that a claimant 
'directed and delivered' a notice of claim than by formal service of papers. Practically 
speaking, if no directing and delivering occurred by Mr. Thomson's actions, it becomes 
hard to imagine the case where defendant would not escape liability simply by pointing 
to some inconsequential item on a notice of claim. Accordingly, Appellant requests that 
this Court find the formal service of papers satisfies the notice of claim requirement. 
Davis County wholly failed to raise their argument regarding damages until filing 
of their reply memorandum. Because Davis County waited to raise the argument, the 
dismissal on that basis should be reversed. Additionally, Melody's claim in this case 
stated several specific injuries and harms, allowing Davis County the opportunity to 
investigate and resolve the matter without needless litigation. No prerequisite exists that 
a claimant place an exact or estimated dollar amount on their damages. The grounds for 
dismissing Melody's claim effectively read into the statute requirements not supported by 
the language of the Governmental Immunity Act. Accordingly, because Melody's notice 
of claim satisfies the express language, the district court's dismissal should be reversed 
and Melody given an opportunity to pursue her claim. 
11 
DATED: May 1,2003 
Peter W. Summerill 
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Addendum A 
UT ST §63-30-11 
U.C.A. 1953 §63-30-11 
Page 1 
c 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 63. STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
CHAPTER 30. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
Copyright ® 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 
LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
Current through the 2002 5th Special Session 
63-30-11 Claim for injury --Notice --Contents --Service --Legal disability --Appointment 
of guardian ad litem. 
(1) A claim arises when the statute of limitations that would apply if the claim were 
against a private person begins to run. 
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or against its 
employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance of the employee's duties, 
within the scope of employment, or under color of authority shall file a written notice of 
claim with the entity before maintaining an action, regardless of whether or not the 
function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental. 
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth: 
(i) a brief statement of the facts; 
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and 
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are known. 
(b) The notice of claim shall be: 
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that person's agent, attorney, parent, or 
legal guardian; and 
(ii) directed and delivered to: 
(A) the city or town recorder, when the claim is against an incorporated city or town; 
(B) the county clerk, when the claim is against a county; 
(C) the superintendent or business administrator of the board, when the claim is against 
a school district or board of education; 
(D) the president or secretary of the board, when the claim is against a special 
district; 
(E) the attorney general, when the claim is against the State of Utah; or 
(F) a member of the governing board, the executive director, or executive secretary, when 
the claim is against any other public board, commission, or body. 
(4) (a) If the claimant is under the age of majority, or mentally incompetent and 
without a legal guardian at the time the claim arises, the claimant may apply to the court 
to extend the time for service of notice of claim. 
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
UT ST §63-30-11 
U.C.A. 1953 §63-30-11 
Page 2 
(b) (i) After hearing and notice to the governmental entity, the court may extend the 
time for service of notice of claim. 
(ii) The court may not grant an extension that exceeds the applicable statute of 
limitations. 
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an extension, the court shall consider 
whether the delay in serving the notice of claim will substantially prejudice the 
governmental entity in maintaining its defense on the merits. 
(d) (i) If an injury that may reasonably be expected to result in a claim against a 
governmental entity is sustained by a potential claimant described in Subsection (4)(a), 
that government entity may file a request with the court for the appointment of a guardian 
ad litem for the potential claimant. 
(ii) If a guardian ad litem is appointed under this Subsection (4)(d), the time for 
filing a claim under Sections 63-30-12 and 63-30-13 begins when the order appointing the 
guardian is issued. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 11; 1978, ch. 27, § 5; 1983, ch. 131, § 1; 1987, ch.75, § 4; 
1991, ch. 76, § 6; 1998, ch. 164, § 1; 2000, ch. 157, § 1. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Amendment Notes. --The 1998 amendment, effective May 4, 1998, substituted "the 
employee's" for "his" in Subsection (2); deleted "the responsible governmental entity 
according to the requirements of Section 63-30-12 or 63-30- 13" from Subsection 
(3) (b) (ii); added Subsections (3) (b) (ii) (A) to (3) (b) (ii) (F); and made stylistic changes 
throughout the section. 
The 2000 amendment, effective July 1, 2001, added Subsection (4)(d). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Application. 
Assignment of municipal debt. 
Clear statement of claims required. 
Conditions for right to recover. 
Damages not specified. 
Defendant's capacity. 
Failure to file claim. 
Notice. 
Sufficiency of notice. 
Nature of claim asserted. 
Parties. 
Statement of facts. 
Waiver of objections by city. 
Cited. 
Constitutionality. 
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
Addendum B 
U T ST § 68-3-2 
U.C.A. 1953 § 68-3-2 
Page 1 
C 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 68. STATUTES 
CHAPTER 3. CONSTRUCTION 
Copyright ® 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 
LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
Current through the 2002 5th Special Session 
68-3-2 Statutes in derogation of common law liberally construed --Rules of equity 
prevail. 
The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation thereof are to be strictly 
construed has no application to the statutes of this state. The statutes establish the 
laws of this state respecting the subjects to which they relate, and their provisions and 
all proceedings under them are to be liberally construed with a view to effect the objects 
of the statutes and to promote justice. Whenever there is any variance between the rules 
of equity and the rules of common law in reference to the same matter the rules of equity 
shall prevail. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2489; C.L. 1917, § 5839; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 88-2-2. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Cross-References. --One form of civil action; law and equity administered in same 
action, Rule 2, U.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Application to particular areas of law. 
In general. 
Questions of first impression. 
Remedial statutes. 
Rules of equity prevail. 
Forfeitures. 
Statutes of foreign states. 
Cited. 
Application to particular areas of law. 
See Remington Rand, Inc. v. O'Neil, 6 Utah 2d 182, 309 P.2d 368 (1957) (garnishment 
proceedings); In re Garr's Estate, 31 Utah 57, 86 P. 757 (1906) (inheritance laws); 
Niblock v. Salt Lake City, 100 Utah 573, 111 P.2d 800 (1941) (liability of city); Utah 
Ass'n of Life Underwriters v. Mountain States Life Ins. Co., 58 Utah 579, 200 P. 673 
(1921) (life insurance); Schuyler v. Southern Pac. Co., 37 Utah 581, 109 P. 458 (1910) 
(penal statutes); Barber Asphalt Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 103 Utah 371, 135 P.2d 266 
(1943) (worker's compensation). 
In general. 
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Addendum C 
-.-'ILED 
NOV 1 5 2002 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF ID AVIS C08BGQND 
STATE OF UTAH 1 DISTRICT CPUR1 
! 
MELODY LITTLE, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DAVIS COUNTY, 
Defendants, 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS AND/OR 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 010700399 TO 
Judge Michael G. Allphin 
The above-entitled matter having come before the Court on Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment; and the Court having reviewed the Motion; and being 
fully advised in the premises, makes the following ruling. 
BACKGROUND 
The matter before the Court concerns an injury which occurred on the sidewalk along the 
side of the old Davis County Courthouse building on August 14, 2000. Plaintiff filed a 
Complaint against the Defendant on August 15, 2001, claiming that Defendant and its agents and 
employees were negligent in failing to grind down a raised lip of concrete and were liable for 
damages. On April 8, 2002, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment 
with Supporting Memorandum. Therein, Defendant argues; 1) As a matter of law, Plaintiffs 
claims are barred for failure to comply with the notice requirements of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11, and 2) That Plaintiffs claims should also be 
dismissed as there was no defect or condition on the sidewalk for which Defendant may be found 
liable to Plaintiff. Plaintiff filed its Memorandum in Opposition to Davis County's Motion for 
Summary Judgment on June 12, 2002. Defendant filed its Reply Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment on June 24, 2002. On September 
16,2002, Defendant filed a Notice to Submit for Decision. 
ANALYSIS 
A motion to dismiss, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is a 
question of law for the Court, wherein the Court is required to determine if the Complaint is 
sufficient on its face. In making that determination, the Court must assume that the factual 
allegations in the Complaint are true and must draw all reasonable inferences in the light most 
favorable to the Plaintiff. Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co.. 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991). 
The purpose of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trial by allowing the parties to 
submit the matter on the pleadings where there is no genuine issue to present to the fact finder. 
In accordance with this purpose, specific facts are required to show whether there is a genuine 
issue for trial. Reagan Outdoor Adv., Inc. v. Lundgren, 692 P.2d 776 (Utah 1984). In 
considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must examine the evidence in "a light 
most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment." Hunt v. Hunt, 785 P.2d 414, 415 
(Utah 1990). 
Having reviewed the parties' filings, the Court addresses the following issues; 1) Whether 
Plaintiff complied with the notice requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11, and 2) Whether there was a defect or condition on the sidewalk for 
which Defendant may be found liable to Plaintiff. 
2 
The Court first examines whether Plaintiff complied with the notice requirements of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11. The Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act reads in part: 
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth: 
(i) a brief statement of the facts; 
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and 
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are known, 
(b) The notice of claim shall be: 
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that person's agent, attorney, 
parent, or legal guardian; and 
(ii) directed and delivered to: 
...(B) the county clerk, when the claim is agamst a county;.... 
On October 25, 2000, a process server named Ken Thomson delivered a document entitled 
"Notice of Claim" to the Davis County Memorial Courthouse. There is a factual dispute as to 
whether the Notice of Claim was left at the front desk or was delivered to Pat Beckstead, a Davis 
County employee, with the understanding that Pat Beckstead would receive service on behalf of 
Steve Rawlins, the Davis County Clerk. The Affidavit of Ken Thomson dated April 18, 2002 
indicates that delivery was made to Pat Beckstead, although the signed Affidavit of Service by 
Ken Thomson dated September 14, 2001 lists personal delivery to Steve Rawlins, the Davis 
County Clerk, and does not check the "LEAVING SAID COPY WITH" box on the Affidavit and 
does not list the name of Pat Beckstead as receiving delivery for Steve Rawlins. Defendant's 
Affidavits would dispute this delivery, but as stated above, in considering a motion for summary 
judgment, the Court must examine the evidence in "a light most favorable to the party opposing 
summary judgment." Hunt v. Hunt. 785 P.2d 414, 415 (Utah 1990). The Notice of Claim was 
addressed to Davis County, the Davis County Attorney, the State of Utah, and the Utah Attorney 
General, but not specifically directed to the Davis County Clerk. At this point, Plaintiff has 
3 
failed to meet the statutory requirements for the Notice of Claim, by not directing the Notice of 
Claim to the county clerk. There is a factual question regarding the actual delivery of the Notice 
of Claim, but regardless, the Notice of Claim was facially deficient. Utah courts have been strict 
in applying the requirements for a Notice of Claim, "[a]pplying this rale of strict compliance, we 
have repeatedly denied recourse to parties that have even slightly diverged from the exactness 
required by the Immunity Act." Wheeler v. McPhersoq 40 P.3d 632, 635 (Utah 2002). The 
Notice of Claim may or may not have been delivered to Steve Rawlins office, but it was not 
directed to the Davis County Clerk, Steve Rawlins. 
The Notice of Claim was also deficient when it did not clearly set forth "the damages 
incurred by the claimant so far as they are known." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11 (3)(a)(iii). The 
Notice of Claim listed the physical damage to Plaintiff and stated that "Plaintiff has also 
sustained pain and suffering, medical expenses, and physical therapy expenses to her damage in 
amounts to be proved at trial." The Notice of Claim was dated October 17, 2000, two months 
and three days after the August 14th fall, however Plaintiff made no definite statement as to 
damages, other than to state "amounts to be proved at trial." Plaintiff had two months to discover 
the damage amounts for immediate injuries, but failed to set forth "the damages incurred by the 
claimant so far as they are known." The Notice of Claim is deficient for purposes of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act and interpretive case law. "[N]or does the letter state the amoimt of 
damages incurred or provide any other information about their extent or nature. There is simply 
nothing upon which even a sympathetic tribunal, as this Court is given the facts of this case, 
could base a finding of substantial compliance." Johnson v. City of Bountiful. 996 F.Supp. 1100, 
1103 (D.Utah 1998). 
Having found that Plaintiffs claims are barred for failure to comply with the notice 
requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11, the Court 
finds no reason to proceed in its analysis of the remaining issue in relation to the Motion to 
Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment before the Court. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and/or for 
Summary Judgment. 
Dated November / j , 2002. 
EX THE COURT: 
:HAEL (£. ALLPHI 
DISTRICT COURT JI5DGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling on November 
/9 , 2002, postage prepaid, to the following: 
James R. Hasenyager 
Peter W. Summerill 
HASENYAGER & SUMMERILL 
1004 Twenty-Fourth Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Linette B. Hutton 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000 
PO Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2668 
flAj 
Robert S. 
Law Clerk to the Honorable Michael G. Allphin 
Addendum D 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT, 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH, DAVIS COUNTY, FARMINGTON 
--00O00--
MELODY LITTLE, ) 
) Deposition of: 
Plaintiff, ) MELODY LITTLE 
vs. ) Date: May 14, 2002 
DAVIS COUNTY, ) Civil No. 010700399 
Defendant. ) 
--00O00--
Deposition of MELODY LITTLE, taken on behalf of 
the Defendant, at WINDER & HASLAM, 175 West 200 South, 
Suite 4000, Salt Lake City, Utah, commencing on May 
14, 2002, before KAPRICE GUNN, a Certified Shorthand 
Reporter and Notary Public within and for the State of 
Utah, pursuant to Notice. 
Little. MeloHv f)pn 
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Q. Did physical therapy also-
A. I saw the - 1 have seen the prescription 
from Dr. McClellan. 
Q. Okay. 
A. I gave them the prescription. 
Q. Okay. 
A. But I have not seen these medical papers, 
no. 
Q. Would Aspen Ridge also have filed directly 
on your medical insurance? Is that why you would not 
have seen any bills from them? 
A. Yes, they sent it into my insurance. I do 
see bills from them, just not this. 
Q. Okay. If you'll look on there, look at the 
dates that are represented. It appears that the only 
appointments that they - at least are included in 
that packet of information occurred in September. 
A. That's what this says? 
Q. That's what it appears to be. 
If you continued to see him after September, 
then it would appear we don't have a complete set of 
records. So could you look into that and see if Aspen 
Ridge can provide us -
A. Yes. 
Q. — a more complete set of records? 
Page 43 
A. Sure. 
Q. And you'll let your attorney know -
A. Yes. 
Q. — and he'll provide those to us as well? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Because they certainly don't show that you 
went until February. 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Okay. Let's see. How did you do with your 
physical therapy? 
A. Not well. As you can tell, I still have a 
very crooked arm. 
Q. So are you still seeing him? 
A. No, no. They tried me on a splint also at 
the end, which was supposed to go home and I'd just 
wear it at night, and it was supposed to — and I 
would tighten it and it straightens. And I sent that 
back. I tried it for over a month. And it wasn't 
that it was so painful, it's just that I couldn't 
sleep at night and then my arm was very sore the next 
day. 
And in my job, a sore arm is not -- it was 
just easier for me to go with a crooked arm. I sent 
it back. And I found out later that my insurance -
25 they assumed my insurance covered it and did not cover 
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MP out of Minnesota, who sent me the splint. So I 1 
gave it back to Aspen Ridge. They sent it back. i 
Okay. I lost my train of thought. Ask me 
your question again. 1 
Q. We would have to have Kaprice do that. i 
MR. SUMMERILL: I think it was how did i 
physical therapy go? 
THE WITNESS: Oh, how did physical therapy I 
go? 1 
MS. HUTTON: Wait a second. f 
(The requested testimony was read as follows: | 
"QUESTION: So are you still seeing him?") 
THE WITNESS: No. | 
Q. (BY MS. HUTTON) So did you discontinue 1 
physical therapy at their suggestion or because you | 
felt that you were finished? L 
A. I felt that I was finished. 1 
Q. Okay. 1 
A. I felt that they had tried just about f 
everything. It was very painful. Physical therapy [ 
was very painful, and everything they tried, my arm 
would still just pop back and still stiffen up and get | 
sore. 1 
So I went back to Dr. McClellan and — 1 
actually, let me think. Let me think. When one of my I 
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children was seeing Dr. McClellan, I asked him — I I 
says, Dr. McClellan, what should I do? He says, It's 1 
my guess you'll have to get it rebroken. And he 1 
suggested at that time an orthopedic surgeon. And I I 
didn't follow through with it. I mean, that's a lot | 
of pain and a lot of rehabilitation again that, with 1 
my work, with things going on within my family, I 1 
chose not to do at that time. I 
I have, though, gone back to Dr. Challburg I 
just recently. I 
Q. Dr. Challburg? 1 
A. Challburg. 1 
Q. How do you spell Challburg? 1 
A C-h-a-1-l-b-u-r-g. He is at the Morgan 1 
Health Center. Dr. McClellan has moved on to Salt [ 
Lake City, I believe. 1 
Q. I see. I see. 1 
A. Dr. Challburg recommended an MRI. He 1 
doesn't know exactly, but is wondering if the tissue [ 
or muscle or blah, blah, blah - but he recommended - | 
they even want to set me up next week with an MRI with I 
an orthopedic surgeon. 1 
Q. I noticed that Bruce McClellan, I 
Dr. McClellan, is listed as a general practitioner. 1 
A. Yes. 
^ ^ ^ —» 
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